John F. Kennedy s Decision Making Process - 1186 Words

Introduction A president s ability to adapt to changes and learn from mistakes is a quality that separates a good leader from a great one. In considering the governmental history of the United States, John F. Kennedy is arguably among the most successful presidents to hold the mantle of commander in chief. However, this degree was not achieved due to his infallible leadership and decision making skills. For this reason, I would like to investigate the extent to which John F. Kennedy’s decision-making process changed from the Bay of Pigs Invasion to the Cuban Missile crisis during his presidency. I chose the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis because the first is an event in John. F. Kennedy’s presidency before he gained experience from this job and the latter is an event from after he was acquainted with the presidential role. This span of time allows for the analysis of how a president changed throughout his presidency in terms of their decision making. Such an understanding is relevant because it can determine the strengths and weaknesses of a person in power that can either be exploited by political opponents or improved upon by future commander-in-chiefs to determine the overall effectiveness of the president. This topic was of interest because an analysis of the both of the events can present the way in which John F. Kennedy changed in relation to his foreign policy between 1961 to 1962. This is relevant to modern day United States because the way inShow MoreRelatedAnalysis Of President John F. Kennedy s Short Term As President Of The United States1544 Words   |  7 PagesPresident John F. Kennedy MSgt Corey B. Kennedy Air Force Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy For two years and ten months, America had a visionary leader that inspired a generation to achieve things as a country once thought impossible. For two years and ten months, America had a president that used ethical leadership in decisions that impacted not just the United States, but the world as a whole, and left a lasting legacy. There are a many defining moments from President John F. Kennedy’sRead MoreThe Leadership Styles And Behavioral Analysis1687 Words   |  7 Pagesthe future† -John F. Kennedy, 35th US President. This paper describes about the Leadership styles and Behavioral analysis of former U.S. president John F. Kennedy. Elected in 1960 as the 35th president of the United States, John F. Kennedy was the youngest man to hold that office. He was born on May 29, 1917, in Brookline, Massachusetts to Joseph P. Kennedy, a self-made multimillionaire who led the Exchange commission and securities under Franklin D. Roosevelt and Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy. He parlayedRead MoreThe United States And The World From A Nuclear Holocaust1408 Words   |  6 Pagesdays, John Kennedy and his administrators crafted and developed solutions that would ultimately save the United States and the world from a nuclear holocaust. During the Cuban Missile crisis, John F. Kennedy was forced to make many difficult decisions on how the United States should respond to the crisis. While listening to the many voices of reason, it became evident there was no easy solution to resolve the conflict and with many possible outcomes. For JFK, The essence of ultimate decision [remained]Read MoreSoon After World War Ii Ended, The United States Of America1782 Words   |  8 Pagesof Space Exploration, 2009). On July 20 of 1969 the U.S.A.’s Apollo 11 mission was successful in ending the Space Race after landing on the moon (Timeline of Space Exploration, 2009). The first lunar landing is one of the most important events in modern human history, because it redefined the boundaries of the universe for humans by extending them to the vastness of space. I analyzed three different sources on the topic: President John F. Kennedy’s speech to Congress, â€Å"Why We Need to Remember theRead MoreRegents of the University of California v. Bakke1203 Words   |  5 Pageseliminate unlawful discrimination between applicants, remedy the results of such prior discrimination, and prevent such discrimination in the future.† Cornell University Law School March 6, 1961: John F. Kennedy signs Executive Order 10925 Sec. 301 (Paragraph 1): â€Å" . . . [Government] contractor[s] will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.† July 6, 1964:Read MoreThe Leadership And Legacy Of John Fitzgerald Kennedy3150 Words   |  13 PagesCamelot: The Leadership and Legacy of John Fitzgerald Kennedy Carson Ray Senior Division Individual Historical Paper Paper Length: 2,470 words To the average person, Camelot was an era of promise, hope, perfection, and the struggle for equality. It was America’s only real with national royalty as the people looked to the president and first lady for fashion, their connections to Hollywood and the very rich, and how to comport themselves in a most glamorous manner..Read MoreLyndon B. Johnson s President Of The United States Essay1712 Words   |  7 Pagesof the Senate and Johnson was elected majority leader. But he did not stop here. In 1960, LBJ wanted to be in the White House. John F. Kennedy won the democratic nomination overwhelmingly. But, being from the north, Kennedy realized that he could not be elected without the support of the Southern Democrats, most of whom had backed Johnson. After the convention, Kennedy offered Johnson the vice presidency and Johnson accepted. The JFK/LBJ ticket won the election against Republican candidate RichardRead MoreThirteen Days Decision Process2313 Words   |  10 Pag esThirteen Days† by Antony Gumi The â€Å"Thirteen Days† movie describes how the 35th president of United States of America (USA), John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK) dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis during the period of October 14-28, 1963. It shows how JFK’s leadership saved the world from having World War III (WWIII), or worse, Nuclear War. JFK’s crisis management and decision-making skills was tested during this period. He was under an extreme pressure, having the Cuban missiles were about to be ready toRead MoreKhrushchev s Influence On America1543 Words   |  7 Pagesfor West Berlin, Khrushchev played a key role by demanding Kennedy attend a meeting to discuss the problem, and subsequently disrespecting the young president. Later on, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, where an American U-2 Spy Plane discovered offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev further complicated the dire situation through his refusal to remove the weaponry. Beyond direct conflicts, Khrushchev sponsored the growth o f the U.S.S.R.’s space program, leading to the launch of Sputnik I, and furtheringRead MoreResponsibilities And Rights : The Capability Approach966 Words   |  4 Pagesmodel? One must be able to utilize freedom in order to exercise moral and responsible decision making. This is not to say that all will, but freedom is essential in order for one to employ such a responsibility, otherwise it would not be individual responsibility. Moreover, the capability approach acknowledges that each individual has principled rights, that if refused, would bankrupt him of something of some benefit(s). Additionally, these individuals are distinguished by analogous rights and their

Ethical Violations in The Monster Study Essay - 861 Words

The Monster study is speech impediment experiment that was done on the children that lived in the orphanage. This experiment was conducted to find out if stuttering was inherited or did environment play a key factor. Wendell Johnson was the speech pathologist that conducted this study to find the cause and cure for stuttering. This study violated a lot of ethical issues because the children were psychological harm, informed consent was not given and the subjects were deceived. Wendell Johnson had a biased opinion in this study because he was a stutter himself and was desperate for a cure. In this paper, I will discuss the background of this experiment and the violations of ethics that were done in this study. The Monster study began on†¦show more content†¦The ten participates that were target as stutters were divided into groups. Five were group IA the experimental set and group IB were the control set. Group IA was told that there speech was fine and they had no problem. The other group IB was told your â€Å"Yes, your speech is as bad as people say. The remaining twelve were ages 5-15 and was chosen randomly and they were separate into two groups of six. Group IIA were told that they were showing signs of stuttering and they must correct themselves immediately. In Group IIB, this was the control group and they were told that their speech was normal and was praised for their enunciation. The subjects in Group IIA sought a lawsuit against the University of Iowa because of their psychology harmed they received from this study. In this case study, there were a few incidents of violations of ethics. In 1998, Callahan recommends that researchers should follow the three ethical i ssues: Autonomy, beneficence, and human justice. Autonomy is the first ethical principle that a researcher should respect the participate and make sure that informed consent has been given. The participates of this study was not aware the risk or what the study was about and actually could not give consent legally because they were minors. Johnson and Tudor did not give full disclosure of this research to the minors, teachers, or matrons at the orphanage. Beneficence is the second ethical principle; the researcher should maximizeShow MoreRelatedMary Shelley s The Human Person1533 Words   |  7 PagesThrough the novel Frankenstein, Mary Shelley delves into ethical and deontological issues concerning the sciences and scientific research – themes that are actually still current in today’s day. Mary Shelley exalts the human person, questioning many truths of the world and what it means to be human, along with all the implications that come with it. The novel also explore s the theme of nature versus nurture, keeping in mind the knowledge and concepts of the time period it was written in, while continuingRead MoreIssues and Intolerance of Sexual Minorities in Arizona1625 Words   |  7 PagesHardwick (Case 106 S. Ct. 1986), was that the Arizona Court of Appeals, citing Bowers, held that the state s sodomy law justified the blocking of a bisexual man from adopting an elementary-school child, because possible past, present, or future violations of the law made him a corrupt and immoral role model and more: It would be anomalous for the state on the one hand to declare homosexual conduct unlawful and on the other create a parent after that proscribed model, in effect proving that standardRead MoreHuman Cloning- Term Paper1576 Words   |  7 Pagesbills in the United States are demanding for the prohibition of reproductive cloning since it has numerous medical and ethical disadvantages. The American Medical Association holds four points of reason why c loning should not take place.   They are: 1) there are unknown physical harms introduced by cloning, 2) unknown psychosocial harms introduced by cloning, including violations of autonomy and privacy, 3) impacts on familial and societal relations, and 4) potential effects on the human gene poolRead MoreHuman Cloning- Term Paper1562 Words   |  7 Pagesbills in the United States are demanding for the prohibition of reproductive cloning since it has numerous medical and ethical disadvantages. The American Medical Association holds four points of reason why cloning should not take place.   They are: 1) there are unknown physical harms introduced by cloning, 2) unknown psychosocial harms introduced by cloning, including violations of autonomy and privacy, 3) impacts on familial and societal relations, and 4) potential effects on the human gene poolRead More Banning Breed Specific Legislation Essay1488 Words   |  6 Pagesfoolishly stereotype and judge individuals based on th eir race or appearance. One of the most recent victims of profiling is the pit bull. Simply looking like or being a pit bull gets many loving creatures falsely accused of being violent, uncontrollable monsters. Pit bulls are the major target of legislation that bans or restricts certain types of dogs based solely on appearance and stereotypes. Breed Specific Legislation (BSL) is a ban or restriction on certain types of dogs because they are perceivedRead MoreEvolving Perspectives On The Ethical Treatment Of Prisoners2129 Words   |  9 Pagesï » ¿Ethical Treatment of Prisoners Figure 1 - Parwan Prison in Afghanistan (Wittet, 2010) Introduction The treatment of the prison population in the United States and around the world has reached a significant amount of salience in the press. Part of the reason that prisons and the treatment of prisoners has gain so much attention is there are extreme cases available in which governments have gone so far as to torture inmates in hopes of gaining intelligence information generally in regardsRead MoreBeing A Nurse And A Crucial Part Of The Health Care Field1891 Words   |  8 Pagesposting a picture without consent violates ethical principle of patient privacy because you are putting your self-interest above the patient’s. The Privacy Rule imposes hefty fines and criminal charges to those who disclose identifiable health information to the public, this includes, oral, paper, or electronic forms. In 2013 a study was conducted to find out how many health professionals used social media and patient confidentiality was broken. The study consisted of 271 medical blogs written byRea d MoreThe Dark Knight Essay2112 Words   |  9 Pagesâ€Å"I’m not a monster, I’m just ahead of the curve,† (The Dark Knight). Was it a madman, a genius, or a nerd who deserves credit for this discomforting quote? It doesn’t really matter because really, it applies to all three. This rather cynical quote from Heath Ledgers portrayal of the Joker in the Dark Knight is representative of the view that society has on those who dare to think a little offbeat. Just as the citizens of Gotham City are driven to fear by the corrupt and frequently sadistic moralityRead More Attack of the Cloning Regulations Essay2139 Words   |  9 Pagesthey are mostly in the form of rebuttals of the points raised by the other side. A large dose of pathos comes up with most of the points seeing as how cloning is not just normal scientific research, it brings up questions of morality and what is ethical in the progress of science. Both sides of the issue tell stories of strong emotional appeal of the people that could be hurt or saved through the use of cloning techniques. These pathos appeals are mainly based on what-if scenarios and seem to beRead MoreAnalysis Of Vertus Hardiman s The Head : A Life Revealed 1779 Words   |  8 Pagesradiation experiments, and the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in African American male, common knowledge would dictate mistrust as a source for reluctance to get involved with Clinical trials. However current data available doesn’t support the notion of African Americans being less likely to participate in clinical research. Actually the opposite is true which may represent a change in attitude due to closing educational gaps. According to a recent study by a University of Florida group, African

Vend Link Vending Business Strategic Marketing Plan

Question: Discuss about the Vend Link Vending Business Strategic Marketing Plan. Answer: Introduction The Vendlink strategic marketing plan is a tool to increase the companys market share by creating awareness and persuading target audience to embrace the companys products and services. This project will highlight the companys current situation, the desired position and the strategies to be used to realize the predetermined goals and objectives. Background Vendlink Company was established in the year 2008. It carries it operations in Melbourne .The company offers healthy coffee, snacks and cold drinks through healthy vending machines. These machines are topped up with customer preferences and the machine acts as a resource for the products. The business installs vendor machines to offer snacks and drinks at convenience to employees or customers without leaving the premises. The company offers free installation and maintenance of the vending machines anywhere around Melbourne. The company is 100% owned by Australian Mission Availing healthy products vending machines Supplying wide product range of snacks, drinks and meals both popular and local brands. Regular machine servicing to optimize operation. The corporate goal The businesss goal is the fulfillment of the promise to deliver, from services to products while connecting with consumers or clients to be of highest standard and quality every time. Marketing Mix Place The Vendlink business will distribute it products in Melbourne. Price Vendlink will charge the existing market prices for snacks and drinks. Products The business will sell snacks, drinks and healthy coffee. Promotion The business will use print media, video advertisements and internet marketing channels to create awareness and persuade target audience. SWOT Analysis Strengths High quality products Strong impact in the market in respect to brand Latest technology available Convenient outlet Reliable Services Weaknesses Quality of the products depends with the supplier. Accessible by few customers. High cost of installation and maintenance Opportunities Offices, Universities and hospitals are unexploited market opportunities of the business. Threats Entry of a new company distributing snacks and drinks. Absolution of the current technology by new invention or innovations ` 3Cs Strategies Corporate appraisal Competitor analysis Customer Analysis Competitors Vendlink will use convenience, reliability and heath to differentiate itself from its competitors in the market. Vendlinks competitors are any other snacks or drinks outlets in Melbourne. Corporate Appraisal The companys success will requires highest standards of cooperation of both employees and managers to implement the marketing plan. Qualified personnel will be required to selectively and to sequence decisions and expertise to enable the company gain edge in key functions. Costs of operations should be maintained at minimum and where the services are too costly, outsourcing can be preferred. Customer The interest of customers and clients will be considered while executing the market plan. The market product service will be differentiated to reach more customers. It also important also to segment the market by objective. Customer usage of the product can be considered to increase satisfaction. This will be done by tailoring services in different outlet differently in order to meet customers expectations. Marketing objectives of the product 15% increase in the volume of sales Proper maintenance of the companys positive growth. Increase Vendlinks vending machines around Melbourne to attain 40% distributing market share. Target Market Segment Universities Offices Hospitals Marketing Strategies Focus Strategy A market penetration Strategy Pull Strategy Full service Retail sales Focus Strategy The business will apply this strategy to remain focused on it segment of the marketplace. The business will pursue this strategy because it cannot be able to comfortably apply either cost leadership strategy or differentiation strategy. A market penetration Strategy Since the business goal to gain more customers and clients, it will fix it prices lower than other outlets. This strategy will be appropriate as it will increase the number of customers using the vending machine in Melbourne. The Pull strategy This strategy will require a direct interface will the customers and clients .This strategy will ensure that the prospects are encouraged to be the customers by influencing their demand around the outlet. Full service retail sales The companys operators will be used in this strategy which will involve selling at the distribution channels to facilitate the sale of products in that outlet. Conclusion The implementation of this Strategic marketing plan will increase Vendlink sales by 15% and attainment of 40% market share in distribution of snacks and drinks .This will be as a result of increased usage of the vending machine to purchase snacks and drinks in several universities, offices and hospitals in Melbourne. References Arun, K., Meenakshi, N. (2011). Marketing management. Noida: Vikas publishing House. Jain, S C. (2001). Marketing planning and strategy: Casebook. Modern, A.R (1999). Business Strategy and planning: A strategic management approach. London: McGraw-Hill. Kotler, Philip (2012). Marketing Management. Pearson Education. P.25. McCArthy, Jerome E.(1975). Basic Marketing: Marketing Approach, fifth edition,Richard D, Irwin, Inc.p .37 Shimizu Koichi.(2003).Advertising Theory and Strategies,18th edition,Souseisha book Company .pp.63-102. Blythe Jim. (2009). Key Concepts in Marketing. Los Angeles: Sage publication ltd. Booms Bernard H., Bitner , Mary Jo .(2001). Marketing Strategies and Organization Structures for Service Firms .Marketing of services. American Marketing Association 47-51

Collective Strategy Development free essay sample

JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www. jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=jwiley. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [emailprotected] org. John Wiley Sons is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Strategic Management Journal. http://www. jstor. org Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, 375-385 (1988) AND COMPETITIVE MATCHING COLLECTIVE RUDIK. F. BRESSER Baruch College, The City University of New York,New York,New York,U. S. A. This paper discusses possibilities for combining collective and competitive strategies. Combinations can be problematic if competitive intentions are disclosed through the information links resultingfrom collective strategies. After describing how different collective strategies may lead to an uncontrolled disclosure of strategic information, a typology evaluating the feasibility of strategy combinations is developed. The typologys implications for research and managerial practice are discussed. A recent development in the business policy literature is a concern with strategic planning at a collective level. Collective strategies are attempts by sets of organizations to manage their mutural interdependence and the system dynamics of their interorganizational environments (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986; Thorelli, 1986). In managing interdependent and dynamic environments, collective strategies can be reactive by absorbing movement within an environment, or they can be proactive by forestalling the unpredictable behavior of other organizations. Firms can use collective strategies in combination with competitive strategies. This paper discusses the extent to which such combinations are feasible. MANAGING INTERDEPENDENCE Organizational interdependence exists whenever one organization does not entirely control all the conditions necessary for achieving a desired action or outcome (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In addition to environmental movement, interdependence can cause problems of decision-making uncertainty for focal organizations. This occurs because the success of activities chosen by any interdependent organization depends on the activities selected by other organizations. Consequently, an interdependent organization may need to consider other organizations actions, and it faces decision-making uncertainty if it is aware of its interdependence and has difficulties in controlling the activities of other organizations. Decision-making uncertainty is most likely to be perceived among horizontally interdependent organizations operating in oligopolistic markets. Under these conditions all organizations are aware of their mutual interdependence and have considerable difficulties in controlling each others behaviors as they compete with one another for market share (Fombrun and Astley, 1982; Pennings, 1981). Business firms can use both competitive and collective strategies to manage their interdependencies. The literature distinguishes three major dimensions of competitive strategies: price, promotional, and product competition strategies (Khandwalla, 1981). Competitive strategies manage interdependence successfully if they result in advantageous competitive positions, thus forestalling interdependence and reducing decisionmaking uncertainty (Pennings, 1981). For Received 20 October 1986 Revised 21 July 1987 ? 0143-2095/88/040375-11$05. 50 1988 by John Wiley Sons, Ltd. 376 R. K. F. Bresser Table 1. Coordination mechanisms for collective strategies Coordination mechanism Regulative legislation Contracting Mergers Joint ventures Interlocking directorates Trade associations Collusion and industry leadership Degree of formalization High High High High Moderate Moderate Low instance, product differentiation can create a protected domain for a focal organization with boundaries hard to penetrate by other competitors. However, in complex business environments interdependencies often are obscured from focal organizations so that individually coping with the dynamics of these environments becomes problematic (Emery and Trist, 1965). In these situations, collective strategies can supplement competitive strategies as a means of coping with the variation of interdependent environments (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a). CONCEPTIONS STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COMPETITIVE AND COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES Bresser and Harl (1986) described the dynamic relationship between competitive and collective strategies as being composed of two strategic perspectives that are dialectically related to one another. For instance, when competitive strategies prevail within a market the resulting turbulence and decision-making uncertainty eventually will encourage organizations to use more collective forms of strategizing. However, when collective strategies prevail and create dysfunctions (such as reductions in strategic flexibility, amplified impacts of external disturbances, and attraction of innovative outsiders) which also cause environmental movement and decision-making uncertainty, competitive strategies may again be considered the more attractive methods for coping with interdependence. The dialectical relationship between competitive and collective strategies implies that organizations should remain alert to potential dysfunctions developing from their operating strategies, and that they should maintain a capacity to alternate between more collective and more competitive forms of strategizing (Bresser and Harl, 1986). However, some conflicts between competitive and collective strategies can be anticipated and should be considered before a particular strategy mix is adopted. This paper evaluates combinations between competitive and collective strategies in light of a potential conflict arising from the need to both share and conceal strategic information. Whenever organizations attempt to use both types of strategies simultaneously, i. e. competitive The term collective strategy has been defined in two different ways (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986). On the one hand a collective strategy is defined as a larger interorganizational network which emerges unintendedly. As individual organizational actions aggregate into interorganizational networks an unintended collective strategy emerges that none of the participating organizations could have foreseen. Developments in the telecommunications industry exemplify the emergence of an unintended collective strategy (Astley and Fombrun, 1983b). On the other hand a collective strategy can also be voluntary and intended. Such a collective strategy results from the purposive collaboration of organizations attempting to manage their mutual interdependence. This paper focuses on voluntary collective strategies, developed by oligopolists to manage their horizontal interdependence. Voluntary collective strategies can be based on different coordination mechanisms. Table 1 presents these mechanisms using degree of formalization as the distinguishing criterion (Bresser and Harl, 1986; Fombrun and Astley, 1983). Regulative legislation (resulting from collective lobbying) and contracting represent coordination forms with high levels of formality. Collective strategies based on interlocking directorates or trade associations are characterized by moderate levels of formality, and collusion as well as industry leadership can be classified as informal coordination mechanisms. Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies strategies in one business area and collective strategies in others, a potential for contradictory activities or conflicts arises, because the major advantage of a collective strategy is a major disadvantage from a competitive point of view. With regard to managing interdependence the major advantage of a collective strategy is that it establishes linkages and communication channels through which information about other interdependent organizations can be obtained. Through this information the behavior of other organizations becomes predictable. This makes an environment more stable and less threatening for a focal organization, and thus reduces decision-making uncertainty (Fombrun and Astley, 1983; Pennings, 1981). Precisely this advantage of a collective strategy (stability through predictability) is a disadvantage if organizations wish to use competitive strategies to further their growth goals. Successful competitive strategies require that organizations maintain the secrecy of their strategic plans to forestall imitation (Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981). However, this need for secrecy is jeopardized if interorganizational linkages and communication channels resulting from a collective strategy allow organizations to predict and anticipate one anothers moves in areas where they wish to compete. Thus, organizations face a risk of uncontrolled information disclosure when using collective and competitive strategies side by side. Risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is defined as the likelihood that a disclosure of strategically sensitive information will occur, where the process of disclosue is uncontrolled from a focal organizations point of view and damaging to its competitive plans. The potential damage resulting from an uncontrolled disclosure of information is particularly salient in oligopolies (the dominant US market structure) because in such markets ompetitors typically are in a position to use sensitive information to exert control over each others fates (Pennings, 1981; Scherer, 1980). Evaluating the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure emanating from collective strategies is important for two reasons. On the one hand, such information disclosure tends to render competitive strategic intentions ineffective. On the other hand uncontrolled information di sclosure tends to aggravate problems of strategic inflexibility. Bresser (1984) and Bresser and 377 Harl (1986) argued that organizations adopting collective strategies limit their strategic flexibility because, by agreeing to abstain from certain types of competitive behaviors such as price competition, they curtail their repertoire of available strategic tools. When considering the problem of uncontrolled information disclosure, losses in strategic flexibility resulting from a collective strategy may be even more encompassing. If the managements of organizations realize that the communication links provided by a collective strategy allow for an uncontrolled disclosure of strategic plans, they may be reluctant to pursue competitive strategies even in those business areas that are not subject to a collective agreement. PROCESSES IMPAIRING SECRECY Since potential combinations between competitive and collective strategies face the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure resulting from collective strategy links, they raise the issue of strategic fit (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). In order to minimize problems of uncontrolled information disclosure it is necessary to obtain some degree of compatability among possible strategy combinations. Attaining a fit between competitive and collective strategies requires first of all an appreciation of the processes that may impair an organizations desire to maintain the secrecy of its strategic plans. Table 2 summarizes for each type of collective strategy the particular processes that may lead to an impairment of secrecy, and it assesses the risk of uncontrolled disclosure of information. If collective lobbying leads to protective regulation the activities of regulators may impede competition (Pennings, 1981). Regulators often collect and disseminate a wealth of information about regulated industries. Through these information flows, regulators can allow competitors to forecast each others moves even in areas that are not subject to regulatory control. For example, Litwak and Rothman (1970) suggested that the Federal Communications Commission had provided the broadcasting networks with so much information about the broadcasting industry that the networks were able to anticipate their competitors behavior and, as a result, effective competition was not possible. The autonomy of 378 R. K. F. Bresser Table 2. Processes impairing secrecy and risk of uncontrolled disclosure by type of collective strategy Type of collective strategy Impairment of secrecy Risk of uncontrolled information disclosure Regulative legislation Contracting Mergers Joint ventures Interlocking directorates Trade associations Collusion and industry leadership Regulators collecting and disseminating information Contracts contingent on information Dissatisfied employees (defectors) Mediation of information Passing on of information due to multiple and indirect communication links Distribution of trade statistics Informal communication High Low Low Intermediate High Intermediate Low regulatory agencies in their information-gathering activities results in high risk of uncontrolled disclosure. Contracting refers to the negotiation of formal agreements among organizations (Thompson, 1967). In general, the information exchanged as a result of contractual negotiations will be focused, avoiding the disclosure of sensitive competitive aspects. However, some contracts such as bank loans may require that focal organizations provide extensive information about their competitive plans. This raises the possibility that information leaks within the information-seeking institution will be exploited by a focal organizations competitors. Since he disclosure of sensitive information in the context of contractual negotiations is not very common, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure can be considered low. Mergers and joint ventures are two special forms of contracting. Mergers, with the exception of hostile takeovers, are contracts through which two or more organizations comneunder common control. Joint ventures can be viewed as partial mergers which preserve the autonomy of the organizatio ns involved. Often mergers are accompanied by a host of administrative problems (Lubatkin, 1983). For example, departments and operations must be consolidated and initial inequities in compensation have to be resolved. If such administrative problems remain unresolved, inefficiencies will result, as well as employee dissatisfaction and turnover. The merger between Kennecott Corp. and Carborundum Co. is a case in point (Business Week, 1983). The two companies managements quarreled over administrative problems and, after a short period of infighting, most Carborundum executives jumped ship. There is danger that defecting executives may disclose strategically sensitive information concerning the merging firms when they join other organizations within the same industry. However, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure resulting from a merger is considered low. This is because senior executives leaving merging firms often receive generous severance compensation for which they promise continued confidentiality. Additionally, since merging firms often develop new strategic concepts, the information available to departing executives is likely to be quickly obsolete. If a collective strategy is based on a joint venture the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is considered to be at intermediate levels. Although the cooperation provided by a joint venture is restricted to specific, mutual business problems, the regularity and longevity of interactions typical of a joint venture may allow participating firms to improve their intelligence about each others competitive strategies. For example, firm representatives engaged in joint ventures can develop friendship ties where they feel free to discuss more general strategic issues. During such discussions sensitive information may be disclosed inadvertently. Interlocking directorates result from organizational co-optation activities whereby organizations appoint external representatives to their Matching Collective and Comnpetitive Strategies boards of directors. Since many directors sit on the boards of two or more companies (Bunting and Barbour, 1971), interlocking directorates emerge which can be used as instruments for managing interdependence and uncertainty by encouiraging cooperation and the formation of collective strategies (Aldrich, 1979; Pennings, 1980, 1981). However, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is high because the scope and the intensity of intra-industry communication facilitated by direct and indirect interlocks is beyond the control of individual organizations. Therefore, it is very difficult for individual organizations to conceal their competitive strategies when their directors have membership in a network of interlocking directorates. Trade associations provide member organizations with special services at low costs. For instance, they may distribute trade statistics, provide credit references on customers, offer legal and technical advice, or help collect bills (Olson, 1965). In addition, associations can aid in removing decision-making uncertainty resulting from interdependence. Since trade statistics generally include prices quoted in recent sales transactions as well as cost developments, member organizations have the opportunity to coordinate their market behavior and thus implement a collective strategy (Scherer, 1980). The dissemination of statistical information provided by trade associations may impair the desire of focal organizations to maintain secrecy their competitive strategies. While firms regiarding are often in favor of price and cost reporting activities, they run the risk that other sensitive information concerning their competitive strategies may also be disclosed. Trade associations sometimes analyze industry trends regarding product development or marketing strategies, and thus allow competitors to anticipate each others moves. A focal organization may have little control over the kind of information being disseminated because trade associations are often dominated by a few powerful organizations. Olson (1965) described the National Association of Manufacturers as largely financed and controlled by a few big corporations, although the association had several thousand members. There is the possibility that such domination leads to activities favoring a handful of member organizations rather than the majority. In addition, the selective services provided by 379 ssociations function as subtle forms of coercion restricting a firms flexibility. The exclusivity and low costs of legal, financial or other services operate as strong incentives for joining or remaining within an association even if a focal organization disagrees with some association activities. Thus, when using trade association activities to enforce a collective strategy, a moderate risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is likely. The term co llusion denotes express agreements, open or secret, that have the purpose of restricting competition. Most collusive agreements are outlawed in the United States because they encourage monopolistic pricing behavior. Nevertheless, collusive practices are widespread and often effective means of managing interdependence. Their attraction is associated with their high degree of informality which makes it difficult for outsiders to detect conspiratorial agreements (Khandwalla, 1981). Industry leadership is a tacit version of collusion based on imitation. It describes a situation where a specific firm is the acknowledged leader in setting prices, and other firms follow. As opposed to collusive agreements, industry leadership has the advantage of not being contrary to the antitrust laws. It is considered legal as long as it is grounded on voluntary imitation rather than explicit communication (White, 1981). Since collective strategies mediated by collusive agreements are based on informal communication and, in the case of industry leadership, on imitation, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is low. Colluding firms will share information only in areas where they wish to cooperate while maintaining the secrecy of their competitive plans. The above risk assessments imply that uncontrolled information disclosure is always damaging for the success of a focal organizations competitive plans. While the dynamics of oligopolistic markets would tend to support this assumption (Scherer, 1980), the degree of damage resulting from uncontrolled disclosure can be viewed as contingent upon several situational variables. Specifically, four situational variables appear important: breadth of information disclosure, quality of information disclosure, asymmetry in interdependence, and event control. These situational variables can facilitate the combination of a high-risk collective strategy with competitive strategies, and they can make the adoption of a 380 Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies dimensions. This is relevant for evaluating strategy combinations because an uncontrolled disclosure of information is less troublesome if competitors are unable to capitalize on the information due to their inability to respond rapidly to a focal organizations competitive moves. Table 3 presents a typology of possible combinations between competitive and collective strategies, and evaluates their feasibility from the perspective of individual firms. Generally, a strategy combination is considered feasible if (1) the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is low. Feasibility evaluations also take into account (2) the degree of competitor responsiveness typical for a competitive dimension, and (3) typical characteristics of specific collective strategies, namely the number of participants involved and the stability of an agreement. Considering typical characteristics of collective strategies is important because such characteristics can modify feasibility ratings that are based on assessments of the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure and the level of competitor responsiveness. Situational variables, described above, may mediate the damage resulting from uncontrolled information disclosure but do not lend themselves to generalizations and therefore are excluded from considerations leading to the typology shown in Table 3. However, in using the typology, situational variables will have to be taken into account, as is shown in the implications section. In Table 3 the competitive dimensions pricing, advertising and promotion, and product innovation are distinguished for each of the seven collective strategies summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Within each of these competitive dimensions, organizations can relate to each other by using either competitive or collective strategies. Thus, six strategy combinations are possible for each type of collective strategy, leading to a total of 42 combinations presented in Table 3. I Since only two values are possible within each competitive dimension, and since the extreme cases (competitive or collective strategies across all competitive dimensions) are irrelevant as they do not represent combinations of collective and competitive strategies, the total number of strategy combinations C for each type of collective strategy can be calculated by collective strategy with low or moderate risks of uncontrolled disclosure problematic. For example, the potential damage resulting from uncontrolled disclosure may be considered low, and thus can facilitate the adoption of a collective strategy where the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is high, when the competitive information that could be disclosed is not very encompassing (breadth of information disclosure), or of questionable quality regarding its reliability and/or timeliness (Adams, 1976; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). Similarly, if interdependence is asymmetric, with some organizations being in a relatively powerful competitive position (e. . due to their size), uncontrolled information disclosure may not be very troublesome for these powerful organizations because they know that other competitors lack the resources to exploit the disclosed information (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Likewise, damage may be low and containable, if organizations can rapidly and effectively counteract events leading to uncontrolled information disclosure, for example, by changing perso nnel or the content of a collective strategy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Implications for evaluating the feasibility of strategy combinations resulting from the role of situational variables are discussed below. COMBINATIONS OF COMPETITIVE AND COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES Apart from an understanding of how collective strategies can lead to uncontrolled information disclosure, an assessment of what types of combinations between competitive and collective strategies are feasible requires that different competitive strategies also be distinguished. Three distinguishing dimensions of competitive strategies are pricing, advertising and promotion, and product innovation (Khandwalla, 1981). These dimensions can be classified according to their degree of competitor responsiveness (Ansoff, 1984). The term competitor responsiveness refers to the speed with which competitors can respond to variations in competitive conditions. While price cuts usually can be matched instantly, it takes much longer to organize retaliations to a heavy advertising campaign, and even longer to respond to product innovations (Khandwalla, 1981; Scherer, 1980). Thus competitor responsiveness decreases along these three competitive C = (21- 2) where d is the number of competitive dimensions considered. For d=-3 dimensions the number of possible strategy combinations is C=6. R. K. F. Bresser Table 3. Combinations of competitive and collective strategies and their feasibility Dimensions of competition Types of strategy Pricing combinations 1. 1 1. 2 1. 3 1. 4 1. 5 1. 6 2. 1 2. 2 2. 3 2. 4 2. 5 2. 6 3. 1 3. 2 3. 3 3. 4 3. 5 3. 6 4. 1 4. 2 4. 3 4. 4 4. 5 4. 6 5. 1 5. 2 5. 3 5. 4 5. 5 5. 6 6. 1 6. 2 6. 3 6. 4 6. 5 6. 6 7. 1 7. 2 7. 3 7. 4 7. 5 7. IL Competition Regulation Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Contracting Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Merger Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Joint Venture Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Interlocks Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Trade Association Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Collusion/IL Collusion/IL Co mpetition Collusion/IL Competition Advertising and promotion Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Regulation Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Contracting Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Merger Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Joint Venture Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Interlocks Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Trade Association Collusion/IL Competition Collusion/IL Competition Competition Collusion/IL 381 Product innovation Regulation Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Contracting Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Merger Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Joint Venture Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Interlocks Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Trade Association Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Collusion/IL Collusion/IL Competition Collusion/IL Competition Competition Feasibility of strategy combination Low Low Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate High High High High High High High High High High High Intermediate Intermediate High High High High Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Industryleadership The first group of (six) strategy combinations uses competition in one or two competitive dimensions in conjunction with regulation as the basis for enforcing a collective strategy. The feasibility of all six combinations is rated either at low or intermediate levels. The first two combinations (1. 1 and 1. 2) have a low feasibility rating. If organizations use regulation to harmonize their promotional and product innovation activities, and have competitive flexibility in the area of pricing (combination 1. 1), their chances of competing successfully are slim. This is because 382 R. K. F. Bresser an industry may remain intense. In fact, often firms merge to obtain strategic advantages in the areas of price competition, promotion or product innovation wlhich may increase rather than decrease competitive interactions. When joint ventures serve as mechanisms to enforce collective strategies, feasibility ratings for strategy combinations are similarly favorable. This form of collective strategizing also tends to involve only a few organizations, allowing for competition within a particular area in spite of joint venture activity. fHowever, joint ventures carry a higher risk of uncontrolled information disclosure than contracting or mergers. Thus cautious feasibility evaluations seem appropriate when a focal organization engages in joint ventures in more than one comnpetitivearea, and when the only competitive dimension not subject to collective coordination is characterized by relatively high levels of competitor responsiveness (combinations 4. 1 and 4. 2). In these situations the relatively high number of information links among firms participating in several joint ventures multiplies the risk and potential damage of uncontrolled disclosure. If organizations choose interlocking directorates to coordinate intra-industry activity, they constantly run a high risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. Co-opted directors may intentionally or inadvertently, directly or indirectly, pass on sensitive information to a focal organizations competitors. Thus, relying on interlocks to enforce collective strategies while simultaneously attempting to maintain some competitive flexibility does not appear feasible. The predominant feasibility rating assigned to the group of strategy combinations using trade associations as a means to develop collective strategies is intermediate. Although experience demonstrates that the coordination provided by trade associations mostly does not go beyond price and cost reporting (Scherer, 1980), the possibility of trade associations collecting and reporting other sensitive information is always acute. Often individual organizations cannot oppose such uncontrolled reporting of industry developments, especially if the association is dominated by a few powerful corporations. If trade associations do not engage in price reporting, but are used to develop collective strategies in the areas of advertising and promotion, and product innovation (combination 6. 1), a low uick competitor responsiveness can be expected with respect to the pricing dimension, and regulators are likely to disclose sensitive information concerning advertising and innovations. A similar argu ment applies to combination 1. 2, where competitive conditions exist only with regard to advertising and promotion, a dimension characterized by intermediate levels of competitor responsiveness. Since competitors usually need considerable time to respond to product innovations, combination 1. 3 (with regulation in the other two dimensions) is not quite as problematic as the first two combinations. However, the distinct possibility of uncontrolled information disclosure through regulator activities makes combination 1. 3 feasible only at an intermediate level. Combinations 1. 4 through 1. allow for competition in at least two dimensions. While these combinations provide organizations with a larger arsenal of competitive tools than the first three combinations, they also are considered feasible only at intermediate levels because of the risk of uncontrolled disclosure through regulators. The feasibility of strategy combinations involving contracting as a form of collective strategizin g generally is considered high because the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure tends to be low. In addition, often (and in contrast to regulation) only few organizations participate in a particular contractual agreement, thus limiting the extent to which competition is constrained. If, within an industry of say eight oligopolists, three contract to standardize product designs, competition with the remaining five oligopolists in the area of product innovations is still possible and likely. The only strategy combination where a less favorable (intermediate) feasibility rating is assigned is combination 2. 1. If extensive contracting in the areas of advertising/promotion and product innovation has considerably lowered the participating firms strategic flexibility, relying on price competition as the sole competitive tool does not appear sensible. Price competition is likely to face a high degree of competitor responsiveness. The third group of strategy combinations, using merger activity to realize collective strategies, has high feasibility ratings throughout. The risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is low, and the number of firms involved in a merger is usually quite small, so that competition within Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies feasibility rating seems appropriate. Again, in this situation firms would maintain competition only in an area where high competitor responsiveness is likely. Combinations of competitive and collective strategies using the various forms of collusion and industry leadership are not as problem-free as the risk evaluation in Table 2 might suggest. Although collusive agreements are not burdened with the problem of uncontrolled information disclosure, their combination with competitive strategies appears feasible at an intermediate level at best. Since collusive agreements are informal and difficult to enforce, individual firmns have a strong incentive to chisel-that is to increase their profits by secretly deviating from the agreement (Stigler, 1964). Secret deviations cannot be concealed for long periods of time, and frequently result in collusive conspiracies breaking down and touching off bitter rivalries such as price wars (Scherer, 1980; Weiss, 1961). It is likely that the tendency of collusive agreements towards breakdown will be aggravated if colluding organizations decide to compete in some competitive areas rather than displaying gentlemanly, non-competitive behavior across all competitive dimensions. A firms successful competitive behavior in one area will encourage less successful firms to chisel in other areas that are subject to collusive coordination. Thus combinations of competitive and collective strategies can be expected to be volatile when collusion serves as a means for enforcing collective strategies. This volatility results from the particular characteristics of collusive agreements, and exists regardless of the risk for uncontrolled information disclosure or the level of competitor responsiveness. 383 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS This paper extends the literature advocating the development of voluntary collective strategies as means to manage environmental turbulence and interdependence (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986). It assesses the possibilities of combining competitive with collective strategies from the perspective of individual organizations. Such combinations may be problematic because an organizations ability to maintain the secrecy of competitive strategic plans may be jeopardized by information links established through different forms of collective strategy (Fornbrun and Astley, 1983a; Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981). After discussing how collective strategies may lead to an uncontrolled disclosure of strategically sensitive information, combinations of competitive and collective strategies are classified according to their varying degrees of feasibility. A comparison of the ratings presented in Tables 2 and 3 makes apparent that the feasibility of strategy combination tends to be inversely related to the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. If the risk and the feasibility ratings are expressed numerically with the values of low equaling 1, intermediate equaling 2, and high equaling 3, a correlation coefficient can be calculated on the basis of all 42 strategy combinations. The resulting coefficient is r = -0. 70, indicating that within the present classification scheme about 50 percent of the variance in feasibility evaluations is accounted for by the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. However, high risks of uncontrolled disclosure do not generally lead to low feasibility ratings, and low risks do not necessarily imply high feasibility scores , as is demonstrated by the combinations involving collective strategies based on regulation and collusion respectively. The unexplained variation in feasibility ratings suggests additional factors are important in assessing the feasibility of strategy combinations, notably the degree of competitor responsiveness and the particular characteristics of the type of collective strategy employed. Further variation in feasibility ratings can be expected when situational variables such as breadth and quality of information disclosure, asymmetry in interdependence, and event control are considered (Adams, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). This is so because these situational variables can contain or amplify the potential damage resulting from uncontrolled infornmationdisclosure. While situational variables were not considered in the development of this papers typology of strategy combinations, they have implications both for research and managerial decision-making that can originate from the typological classification given in Table 3. The existence of situational variables highlights a feature common to all typologies or organi- 384 R. K. F. Bresser information disclosure is of little relevance? 7. How rapidly and effectively can events of uncontrolled information disclosure be counteracted? Answers to these and similar questions can help executives to apply the information provided by Table 3 situationally before adopting a specific combination of collective and competitive strategies. From this process the selection of compatible strategies should result. This papers discussion has concentrated on oligopolistic markets because, typically, in such markets competitors are aware of their mutual interdependence, have incomplete control of each others moves, and yet the success of each oligopolists strategic intentions depends considerably on the activities chosen by other competitors (Pennings, 1981). Obviously, within such a context, the damage resulting from an uncontrolled disclosure of sensitive information is potentially high. While the theory of oligopoly has been developed mainly for domestic, nondiversified enterprise (Stigler, 1964), the issues and ideas discussed in this paper can also be of relevance to multinational and diversified corporations. Due to the dominance of oligopolies, both multinational and diversified firms will often find themselves operating in different national or regional oligopolies. Additionally, managing a match between collective and competitive strategies may be more difficult in interindustry and international arenas than in intraindustry environments because the number of interdependent segments representing a particular coporations domain is larger and more complex (Bresser and Harl, 1986; Hawkins and Walter, 1981). Thus, anticipating factors such as the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure and the potential damage resulting from such disclosure may be even more important for multinational and diversified firms than for domestic oligopolists. zational phenomena. Classifications of the type developed in Table 3 are ideal types, based on generalizations derived from common knowledge and common sense (Blau and Scott, 1962; Pugh, Hickson and Hinings, 1969). However, the strategy combinations distinguished represent 42 separate hypotheses regarding the opportunities and risks organizations might encounter when utilizing competitive and collective strategies side by side. The accuracy of any particular feasibility evaluation is an empirical question open to resolution through historical research, where the mediating role of situational variables has to be included in the research design. From a managerial point of view a typology of strategy combinations with varying levels of feasibility can aid in strategic decision-making. The strategic options evaluated in Table 3 can serve as a guide to managers considering a particular strategy combination. In attempting to extrapolate easibility evaluations, decisionmakers would have to assess whether the variables leading to the feasibility ratings shown in Table 3 are of the assumed magnitude, and to what extent deviations would lead to different feasibility assessments. In addition, decision-mak ers would have to evaluate the extent to which situational variables require changes in feasibility ratings. For example, a firm intending to implement a strategy mix similar to combination 4. 3 would have to consider the following questions before deciding whether the feasibility of such a combination is high: 1. Is the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure resulting from the planned joint venture activity really at moderate levels, and how can it be contained? 2. Is there really a low degree of competitor responsiveness to product innovations within this industry? 3. Is competitive flexibility in pricing and promotional strategies maintained in spite of joint venture activity within these competitive dimensions? 4. How encompassing is the information that could get disclosed? 5. How reliable and timely is the information that competitors could obtain? 6. Does asymmetrical interdependence typical for this industry favor our firm so that REFERENCES Adams, J. S. The structure and dynamics of behavior in organizational boundary roles. In Dunette, M. (ed. ), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 1175-1199. Rand McNally, Chicago, 1976, pp. Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies Aldrich, H. E. Organizations and Environment, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1979. Ansoff, H. I. Implanting Strategic Management, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984. Astley, W. G. and C. J. Fombrun. Collective strategy: social ecology of organizational environments, Academy of Management Review, 8, 1983a, pp. 576-587. Astley, W. G. and C. J. Fombrun. Technological innovation and industrial structure: the case of telecommunications. In Lamb, R. (ed. ), Advances in Strategic Management, vol. 1, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1983b, pp. 205-229. Blau, P. M. and W. R. Scott. Formal Organizations, Chandler, San Francisco, 1962. Bresser, R. K. The captives of collective strategies, Proceedings of the American Institute for Decision Sciences, Toronto, 1984, pp. 383-385. Bresser, R. K. and J. E. Harl. Collective strategy: vice or virtue? , Academ. y of Management Review, 11, 1986, pp. 408-427. Bunting, D. and J. Barbour. Interlocking directorates in large American corporations, 1896- 1964, Business History Review, 45, 1971, pp. 317-335. Business Week. How Kennecott has mismanaged Carborundum, 23 May, 1983, pp. 127-130. Emery, F. E. and E. L. Trist. The causal texture of organizational environments, Human Relations, 18, 1965, pp. 21-32. Fombrun, C. J. and W. G. Astley. The telecommunian institutional cations community: overview, Journal of Communication, 32(4), 1982, pp. 6-68. Fombrun, C. J. and W. G. Astley. Beyond corporate strategy, Journal of Business Strategy, 4(1), 1983, pp. 47-54. Hawkins, R. G. and I. Walter. Planning multinational operations. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 253-267. Khandwalla, P. N. Properties of competing organizations. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 409-432. Litwak, E. and J. Rothman. Towards the theory and practice of coordination betwe en formal organizations. In Rosengren, W. R. and M. Lefton (eds), Organizations and Clients: Essays in the Sociology 385 of Service, Merrill, Columbus, OH, 1970, pp. 137-186. Lubatkin, M. Mergers and the performance of the acquiring firms, Academy of Management Review, 8, 1983, pp. 218-225. Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965. Pennings, J. M. Interlocking Directorates, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1980. Pennings, J. M. Strategically interdependent organizations. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 434-455. Pfeffer, J. and C. R. Salancik. The External Control of Organizations, Harper and Rowe, New York, 1978. Pugh, D. S. , D. J. Hickson and C. R. Hinings. An empirical taxonomy of structures of work organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly, 14, 1969, pp. 115-126. Scherer, F. M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd edn, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1980. Smart, C. and I. Vertinsky, Designs for crisis decision units, Administrative Science Quarterly, 22, 1977, pp. 640-657. Starbuck, W. H. and P. C. Nystrom. Designing and understanding organizations. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. ix-xxii. Stigler, G. J. A theory of oligopoly, Journal of Political Economy, 72, 1964, pp. 44-61. Thompson, J. D. Organizations in Action, McGrawHill, New York, 1967. Thorelli, H. B. Networks: between markets and hierarchies, Strategic ManagementJouirnal,7, 1986, pp. 37-51. Venkatraman, N. and J. C. Camillus. Exploring the c oncept of fit in strategic management, Academy of Management Review, 9, 1984, pp. 513-525. Weiss, L. W. Economics and American Industry, John Wiley, New York, 1961. White, L. J. How organizations use exchange media and agreements. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 2, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 440-453.